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Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is the study of formal logics that reason about knowledge
change. In DEL research, events that cause changes in knowledge are called updates. One class
of updates—the BMS updates due to Baltag, Moss, and Solecki—has received much attention
in the DEL literature because of the joint expressive power of the various BMS Logics based on
these updates. There is, however, very little known about the relative expressive power of the
BMS Logics based on individual BMS updates.
The purpose of the present paper is two-fold. First, we provide a succinct, self-contained
exposition of the rather complicated syntax and semantics for the class of BMS Logics. Second,
we study the relative expressivity of BMS Logics for public and private communication. The
results we obtain are a first-step in a larger study whose aim is to characterize the relative
expressive power of BMS Logics in general.
1 Introduction
In the epistemic reading of multi-modal logic, we assume that a complete description of a certain
moment in time is given by a multi-agent Kripke model [5]. Kripke models, as we all know, consist
of a nonzero number of worlds—each corresponding to a propositional model (that is, a truth
assignment)—along with various binary relations, one for each agent, that may or may not hold
between two given worlds. The binary relations represent an agent’s uncertainty: if world ∆ is
related to world Γ by agent i’s relation, then agent i will consider it possible that the actual world
is ∆ whenever the world is in fact Γ. So for agent i to know something at world Γ, that something
must be true at Γ and at all those worlds i considers to be possible at Γ. This is just Hintikka’s
notion of knowledge [7].
While we have said that a Kripke model is a complete description of a certain moment in time,
we have not yet said how time progresses from one moment to the next. In Dynamic Epistemic
Logic (DEL), time progresses based on the occurrence of certain events called updates. An update
is just a function that maps us from one moment to the next moment (that is, from one Kripke
model to another Kripke model). To study a particular update π, the approach in DEL is to extend
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the language by introducing a new modal—let us write it as [π] for the moment—whose meaning is
to execute the update π. So if ϕ is a formula, then the new formula [π]ϕ has the informal reading
“ϕ holds after the update π occurs.” Semantically, the formula [π]ϕ is said to be true at world Γ
of the Kripke model M if and only if the following holds: if π can be executed at Γ in model M ,
then ϕ is true at the world π(Γ) in the model π(M). Here π(M) is the Kripke model that results
from applying the update π to the model M , and π(Γ) is the world in π(M) that we are taken to
when π is executed at the world Γ in M . So we see that [π]ϕ expresses a before-after relationship
with respect to the update π: if π can be executed, then its execution leads to a new situation in
which ϕ is true.
Work on updates goes back to Plaza [9] and Gerbrandy [6], who independently defined the
public announcement update, which acts as a form of public communication to all agents in the
Kripke model. Baltag, Moss, and Solecki (BMS) extended the Plaza-Gerbrandy work by developing
what we call the BMS updates [2, 1, 3], which have become quite popular in the DEL literature.
BMS updates are structurally complicated and, since each collection of BMS updates yields a logical
language describing the updates in that collection, we are led to an even more complicated hierarchy
of logical languages. BMS Logic is the name we give to the family of all logics that are based on
these logical languages. We parameterize these logics by the BMS updates that are described in
the language of a given logic.
The first task of this paper is to present a succinct, self-contained overview of the complicated
syntax and semantics of BMS Logic. Of notable omission in this overview are the axiomatic systems
for the various BMS Logics.1 The reason for this omission is that our interest later in the paper will
be to study issues of language expressivity (which will not involve axiomatics). In particular, we
will study the relative expressivity of the BMS Logic for public communication, the BMS Logic for
private communication, and the BMS Logic for disguised private communication. We will see that
public communication and private communication are expressively incomparable, while disguised
private communication is strictly more expressive than both public and private communication.
Taken together, our results extend previous expressivity work in [9, 6, 1, 3] and may be viewed
as a first-step in a larger study whose goal is to provide a general characterization of the relative
expressivity of the various BMS Logics as a whole. With this in mind, let us proceed by introducing
the language of BMS Logic.
2 The Language of BMS Logic
The language of BMS Logic is the extension of the language of n-agent epistemic logic obtained by
admitting formula closure under certain modals that we call BMS modals.
Definition 2.1. Given a language L and a modal [π], the language obtained (from L) by admitting
formula closure under [π] is the language L′ whose rules of formula formation are those of L in
addition to the following: if ϕ is an L′-formula, then [π]ϕ is also an L′-formula.
BMS modals are defined relative to certain finite structures we call BMS frames.
Definition 2.2 (Adapted from [1]). For a positive integer n, an n-agent BMS frame is a tuple
(W, {Si}ni=1, d), where for some integer m ≥ 1, we have
1The interested reader should consult [1, 3] for an axiomatic study of BMS Logic.
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• W is the (nonempty) set {1, 2, 3, . . . ,m} of the first m positive integers—we will occasionally
refer to the members of W as worlds;
• each Si is a binary relation on W ; and
• d is an integer satisfying 0 ≤ d ≤ m.
We will omit mention of “n-agent” when n is clear from context. Notice that m is just |W |, the
size of W .
A BMS frame acts as a schema for formation of BMS modals in the following sense.
Definition 2.3. Let L be a language and B = (W, {Si}ni=1, d) be a BMS frame. If {ψi}di=1 is a
sequence of L-formulas and a ∈ W , then we call [{ψi}di=1]a a BMS modal (based on BMS frame
B in language L). Convention: if d = 0, then {ψi}di=1 denotes the empty sequence. We use the
symbol ε for the empty sequence, so a BMS modal based on a BMS frame with d = 0 has the form
[ε]a.
Remark 2.4. Assume the notation of Definition 2.3 and let m = |W |. It is helpful to picture
the BMS modal [{ψi}di=1]a as compact description of a function that maps the integers in W to
L-formulas according to the following diagram:
W = { 1 2 3 · · · d− 1 d d+ 1 d+ 2 d+ 3 · · · m }7→ 7→ 7→
· · ·
7→ 7→ 7→ 7→ 7→
· · ·
7→
ψ1 ψ2 ψ3 · · · ψd−1 ψd > > > · · · >
Here we have assigned the propositional constant > (truth) to each integer x ∈ W that is strictly
larger than d (meaning x > d). The reason we choose > instead of some other L-formula will be
made clear after we have introduced the semantics. (Notice that if d = 0, then our convention in
Definition 2.3 has us assign > to every integer x ∈W .) The superscript a ∈W in the BMS modal
[{ψi}di=1]a acts to distinguish the L-formula in the a-th coordinate. We will say more on this in the
section on the semantics of BMS Logic.
We are interested in extensions of multi-modal epistemic logic obtained by admitting formula
closure under the BMS modals that are based on any one of a finite collection of BMS frames.
(The restriction to a finite collection is both to keep things relatively simple and also to ensure that
our languages are countable.) We thus view the language of BMS Logic as a family of languages
parameterized by the fixed collection of BMS frames on which BMS modals are based. We now
give a name for this fixed collection of BMS frames.
Definition 2.5 (Adapted from [1]). For a positive integer n, an n-agent signature is a finite indexed
set {Bj}j∈J of n-agent BMS frames.2 (So J is a finite set.) We will omit mention of “n-agent”
when n is clear from context.
Since an n-agent signature {Bj}j∈J contains a number of BMS frames, it will be important to
indicate the frame Bj on which a given BMS modal is based. To do this, we will add the subscript j
to the BMS modals based on Bj . This leads us to the notion of a BMS modal based on a signature
(as opposed to a BMS modal based on a BMS frame, Definition 2.3).
2Saying that C is a finite indexed set means that there is a finite set J and a bijection f : J → C. J is the index
set or set of indicies, and each j ∈ J is an index. f maps each index j to the unique member f(j) of C that is indexed
by j, and so f(j) is called the j-th member of C.
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Definition 2.6. Let L be a language and B = {(Wj , {Sj,i}ni=1, dj)}j∈J be an n-agent signature. If
{ψi}
dj




j a BMS modal (based on
signature B in language L). Convention (as in Definition 2.3): {ψi}
dj
i=1 denotes ε if dj = 0.
We may now define the language of BMS logic based on a signature.
Definition 2.7 (Adapted from [1]). Let L be a language and B be an n-agent signature. L(B), the
language of BMS Logic (based on signature B and language L), is obtained from L by admitting
formula closure under each BMS modal based on signature B in language L(B).3 (Notice that L(B)
contains formulas that have BMS modals nested inside other BMS modals.)
Notation (~χ). Since it is a nuisance to use so many symbols in writing the sequence of formulas
appearing in a BMS modal, we adopt the following notational conventions.
• ~χ abbreviates a finite (possibly empty) sequence {χi}mi=1.
• A BMS modal based on a signature {(Wj , {Sj,i}ni=1, dj)}j∈J will be written as [~ψ]aj , which
means that m = dj for the sequence {ψi}mi=1 abbreviated by ~ψ.
• If the sequence ~ψ is of length one, we will write the BMS modal [~ψ]aj as [ψ]aj , and the symbol
ψ will represent the first (and only) formula in the sequence ~ψ.
In Definition 2.7, we defined the language L(B) of BMS Logic in terms of two parameters:
a signature B and a language L. Before we introduce the semantics for L(B), we identify three
languages L that will be of particular interest in this paper. (Actually, we are most interested in
the second two; we define the first for reasons of concreteness.)
Definition 2.8. The language of propositional logic consists of the propositional constants >
(truth) and ⊥ (falsity), a countable collection of propositional letters, and symbols for the Boolean
connectives (note that we use ⊃ for implication). The atoms consist of the propositional constants
and the propositional letters. The propositional formulas are built up from the atoms using the
Boolean connectives.
Definition 2.9 (Ln). Let n be a positive integer. Ln, the language of n-agent epistemic logic, is
obtained from the language of propositional logic by admitting formula closure under each of the
modals K1,K2,K3, . . . ,Kn.
Definition 2.10 (LnC). Let n be a positive integer. LnC , the language of n-agent epistemic logic
with common knowledge, is obtained from Ln by admitting formula closure under the modal C.
For readability, we find it useful to introduce the following notation for dual modals.
Notation. Fix a language LnC(B). The modal K̂i abbreviates ¬Ki¬, the modal Ĉ abbreviates
¬C¬, and the modal 〈~ψ〉aj abbreviates ¬[~ψ]aj¬.
3Thus L(B) is the language whose rules of formula formation are are those of L in addition to the following rule: if
{ψi}
dj




jϕ is also an L(B)-formula.
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Finally, we define a notion of depth for formulas in the language of BMS Logic. Our notion of
formula depth counts the maximum nested depth of modals in a way that ensures that the formula
[~ψ]ajϕ is of strictly greater depth than each of its immediate subformulas.
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Definition 2.11. Let B be a fixed n-agent signature and ϕ be an LnC(B)-formula. The depth of ϕ,
written d(ϕ), is given by induction on the construction of ϕ as follows.
d(p) := 0, for p an atom
d(χ ⊃ ψ) := max(d(χ), d(ψ))
d(Kiψ) := 1 + d(ψ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
d(Cψ) := 1 + d(ψ)





i=1 d(ψi) := 0.) Other Boolean connectives are handled as is implication (that
is, Boolean connectives take the maximum over the depths of immediate subformulas, adding no
additional depth). The depths of LnC-formulas, Ln(B)-formulas, and Ln-formulas are defined by
dropping the appropriate clauses above.
3 The Semantics of BMS Logic
Both Ln(B)-formulas and LnC(B)-formulas are interpreted in n-agent Kripke models.
Definition 3.1. For a positive integer n, an n-agent Kripke model is a tuple (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ), where
• W is a nonempty set whose elements are called worlds,
• each Ri is a binary relation on W , and
• V is a function mapping each world Γ to a (possibly empty) set V (Γ) of propositional letters.
Various relational conditions may be imposed on some or all of the Ri’s. We will omit mention of
“n-agent” when n is either unimportant or else clear from context.
Formulas in the language of BMS Logic are interpreted at model-world pairs.
Definition 3.2. A model-world pair is a pair (M,Γ) consisting of an n-agent Kripke model M and
a world Γ in M . To say that a model-world pair (M ′,Γ′) is in the model M means that M ′ = M .
We now say what it means for a formula in the language of BMS Logic to be true at a model-
world pair.
Definition 3.3 (Adapted from [1]). Let (M,Γ) be a model-world pair in the n-agent Kripke model
(W, {Ri}ni=1, V ). For a formula ϕ ∈ LnC(B), we write M,Γ |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at (M,Γ),
and we write M,Γ 6|= ϕ to mean that ϕ is not true at (M,Γ). Truth of a formula at a model-world
pair is defined by induction on formula construction as follows.
1. M,Γ |= > and M,Γ 6|= ⊥.
4Here an immediate subformula of ϕ is a formula ψ that appears in the antecedent of the rule of formula formation
that builds ϕ from other formulas (including ψ).
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2. M,Γ |= p means that p ∈ V (Γ), where p is a propositional letter.
3. Boolean connectives are defined in the mathematical meta-language. Example: M,Γ |= ϕ ⊃ ψ
means that M,Γ |= ϕ implies M,Γ |= ψ.
4. M,Γ |= Kiϕ means that ΓRi∆ implies M,∆ |= ϕ, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5. M,Γ |= Cϕ means that Γ (
⋃n
i=1Ri)
∗ ∆ implies M,∆ |= ϕ, where S∗ is the reflexive-transitive
closure of the relation S.5
6. M,Γ |= [~ψ]ajχ has one of two meanings.
(a) If a ≤ dj , it means that M,Γ |= ψa implies M [~ψ]j , (Γ, a) |= χ.
(b) If a > dj , it means that M [~ψ]j , (Γ, a) |= χ.
Here the modelM [~ψ]j , called the model induced by [~ψ]aj , is given by the following construction,
called the BMS (product) update.6 Defining the sets
W
≤dj
j := {x ∈Wj | x ≤ dj} and W
>dj
j := {x ∈Wj | x > dj} ,
M [~ψ]j = (W ′, {R′i}ni=1, V ′) is defined as follows.
• W ′ := {(Γ, k) ∈W ×W≤djj : M,Γ |= ψk} ∪ (W ×W
>dj
j ),
• (Γ, k)R′i(∆, l) means both ΓRi∆ and kSj,il, and
• V ′(Γ, k) := V (Γ).
Truth for formulas in LnC is obtained by dropping Case 6. Truth for formulas in Ln(B) is obtained
by dropping Case 5. Truth for formulas in Ln is obtained by dropping Cases 5 and 6. To say that
a formula ϕ is valid means that ϕ is true in every model-world pair; a validity is a valid formula.
Remark 3.4. Assume the notation in Definition 3.3. Notice that
W ×W>djj = {(Γ, k) ∈W ×W
>dj
j : M,Γ |= >} .
This is the reason that we chose the formula > (truth) in Remark 2.4 as the formula to assign to
those integers in W>djj .
It is well-known that Kripke models may be used to represent situations of knowledge, belief,
and uncertainty [5]. Functions from n-agent Kripke models to n-agent Kripke models are called
updates because they may be viewed as a change in situation caused by some event. (Example:
while waiting for my plane to board, I hear an announcement that my plane is now boarding; this
announcement is an update because it is an event that causes a change in situation with respect
to my knowledge.) The construction in Definition 3.3 defines the way in which a BMS modal
[~ψ]aj induces an update called the BMS (product) update. Since BMS updates involve a relatively
complicated construction, it may be helpful to understand the update induced by a BMS modal
[~ψ]aj in a stepwise fashion, as follows.
5For S ⊆W ×W , let S0 := {(x, x) | x ∈W} and let Si+1 := {(x, z) | (x, y) ∈ Si ∧ (y, z) ∈ S} for each i ≥ 1. Then




6The superscript a is dropped from the model M [~ψ]j because it does not play a role in the construction. Thus for
each a, b ∈Wj , we have that [~ψ]aj and [~ψ]bj induce the same model M [~ψ]j .
6
1. Notational preliminaries.
(a) Let m := |Wj |.
(b) If N = (WN , {RN,i}ni=1, VN ) is a Kripke model and χ is a LnC(B)-formula, then let χN
be the set of worlds in N at which χ is true:
χN := {Γ ∈WN : N,Γ |= χ} .
When convenient, we will identify χN with the submodel (W ′N , {R′N,i}ni=1, V ′N ) of N given
by W ′N := χ
N , R′N,i := RN,i ∩ (W ′N ×W ′N ), and V ′N (Γ) = VN (Γ) for Γ ∈W ′N .
2. For each integer i satisfying 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define the formula χi by
χi :=
{
ψi if i ≤ dj ,
> if i > dj .
This gives us a sequence {χi}mi=1 of LnC(B)-formulas (as in Remark 2.4 on Page 3).
3. Produce m disjoint copies of the model M .
M × {1} M × {2} · · · M × {d− 1} M × {d} M × {d+ 1} · · · M × {m}
4. Map the i-th copy of M to the submodel χMi defined by the i-th formula χi. Place this
submodel in position i.





ψM1 × {1} ψM2 × {2} ψMd−1 × {d− 1} ψMd × {d} >M × {d+ 1} >M × {m}
Notice that >M = W .






(χMi × {i}) =
dj⋃
i=1




= {(Γ, k) ∈W ×W≤djj : M,Γ |= ψk} ∪ (W ×W
>dj
j ) .
6. The relation R′i connecting a world Γ in the position-k submodel with a world ∆ in the
position-l submodel is defined componentwise:
(Γ, k)R′i(∆, l) means that ΓRi∆ and kSj,i, l .
7. The set of propositional letters that are true at world Γ in the position-k submodel is given
by the valuation V from the original model M :
V ′(Γ, k) = V (Γ) .
8. M [~ψ]j is the resulting model (W ′, {R′i}ni=1, V ′).
So the meaning of M,Γ |= [~ψ]ajϕ is as follows: if χa holds at world Γ in model M , then ϕ holds at
Γ in the position-a submodel χMa when we interconnect χ
M
a with the other submodels as in M [~ψ]j .
Written with more notation: M,Γ |= χa implies M [~ψ]j , (Γ, a) |= ϕ.
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4 Relative Expressivity
In studying the relative expressivity of two languages L and L′, we are concerned with the following
informal question: can one language say something that the other cannot? This question is in
essence a question of semantics (after all, L-formulas and L′-formulas in general need not have the
same syntactic form). So once we have found a common semantics for L and L′, we may then
ask whether we can map L-formulas to L′-formulas in a way that preserves truth in the common
semantics (meaning the image formula is true in a model of the common semantics exactly when
its preimage is true in that same model). This gives us a formal understanding of our informal
question above. Let us see how this definition looks for the specific case of BMS Logic.
Definition 4.1. To say that the LnC(B)-formula ϕ is expressible by the LnC(B′)-formula ϕ′ (or that
ϕ′ expresses ϕ) means that for every model-world pair (M,Γ), we have M,Γ |= ϕ exactly when
M,Γ |= ϕ′.
Definition 4.1 provides us with a sense in which a formula in one BMS language can be said
in another BMS language: ϕ can be said in LnC(B′) exactly when there is a LnC(B′)-formula ϕ′
that expresses ϕ (in the sense of Definition 4.1). Our understanding of what it means to say that
ϕ cannot be said in LnC(B′) is as follows: ϕ distinguishes two model-world pairs (meaning ϕ is
true in one and not true in the other) and yet these two pairs are indistinguishable (meaning not
distinguished) by any LnC(B′)-formula. This provides a sense of the non-expressivity of ϕ in LnC(B′)
by the following considerations. Model-world pairs may be seen as situations (that is, complete
descriptions of the universe in a certain moment of time). If we have that ϕ expresses something
true in situation s1 and that ϕ expresses something false in another situation s2, then for a LnC(B′)-
formula ϕ′ to say the same thing as does ϕ, the formula ϕ′ itself ought to be true in s1 and false
in s2. So if situations s1 and s2 are indistinguishable to ϕ′, then ϕ′ cannot be saying the same
thing as is ϕ. And if situations s1 and s2 are indistinguishable to every LnC(B′)-formula, then no
LnC(B′)-formula says the same thing as does ϕ. This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 4.2. To say that the LnC(B)-formula ϕ is not expressible in LnC(B′) means that for every
non-negative integer r, there are model-world pairs (M1,Γ1) and (M2,Γ2) such that each of the
following holds:
1. for every LnC(B′)-formula ϕ′ with d(ϕ′) ≤ r, we have M1,Γ1 |= ϕ′ exactly when M2,Γ2 |= ϕ′;
and
2. both M1,Γ1 |= ϕ and M2,Γ2 6|= ϕ.
In Definition 4.2, the world-model pairs that serve as counterexamples to the expressivity of
ϕ by a LnC(B′)-formula of depth at most r may in fact depend on r. A stronger notion of non-
expressivity would require that a single model-world pair act as a uniform counterexample for every
r. While we have used the weaker notion in proving the results that appear in this paper, some
results may still hold for the stronger notion—an issue that awaits further investigation.
We conclude this section with the definitions of relative expressivity.
Definition 4.3. To say that LnC(B) is more expressive than LnC(B′) means that every LnC(B′)-
formula is expressed by some LnC(B)-formula. To say that LnC(B) and LnC(B′) are equally expressive
means that each language is more expressive than the other. To say that LnC(B) is strictly more
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expressive than LnC(B′) means that the former is more expressive than the latter and that the
latter is not more expressive than the former. To say that LnC(B) and LnC(B′) are expressively
incomparable means that neither language is more expressive than the other.
5 Relative Expressivity of Public and Private Communication
Though BMS Logic may be viewed as a fragment of PDL [10], BMS Logic is itself of interest
due to the natural way in which one can specify various complicated updates that mix public
communication with varying degrees of private communication. In this section, we will look at
the logics based on three signatures: a signature for public communication, a signature for private
communication, and a signature for disguised private communication. We will then compare the
relative expressivity of the languages based on each of these signatures.
5.1 Public Announcements
Our first signature induces BMS updates that only communicate public information, in a sense we
describe in a moment. These updates, called public announcements, were studied by Plaza [9] and
Gerbrandy [6] before the introduction of BMS Logic.
Definition 5.1 (Adapted from [1]). Let P be the n-agent signature containing the single BMS
frame
({1}, {(1, 1)}ni=1, 1) .
That is, the set of worlds is {1}; for each integer i satisfying 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the relation Ri is {(1, 1)};
and d = 1.7 The language Ln(P), also written PALn, is called the language of public announcement
logic (without common knowledge). The language LnC(P), also written PAL
n
C , is called the language
of public announcement logic with common knowledge.
A public announcement of a formula ϕ is an update that takes a model M to the submodel
ϕM of M defined by ϕ.8 In PALn (or PALnC), a public-announcement formula has the form [ϕ]
1
1ψ
and is given the informal reading “ψ holds after ϕ is publicly announced.” A public announcement
is viewed as a public communication by way of analogy: if p is a propositional letter, then the
PALnC-formula [p]
1
1Cp (“p is common knowledge after p is publicly announced”) is valid.
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5.2 Private Announcements
Just as there is a BMS update for public communication to each of the n agents in an n-agent
Kripke model, there is a BMS update for a private communication to exactly one of the n agents.
7We probably should have written this BMS frame as ({1}, {{(1, 1)}}ni=1, 1). (Note the extra pair of curly brackets.)
However, we find the notation less clunky in this situation when we identify the singleton set {(1, 1)} with its only
element (1, 1).
8See Item 1b on Page 7 for the definition of ϕM .
9Not all formulas become common knowledge after they are announced; in fact, some true formulas become false
after they are announced (example: p∧¬K1p). See [11] for a summary of work done on characterizing the successful
formulas (those formulas that remain true after they are announced).
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Definition 5.2 (Adapted from [1]). Given positive integers n and j such that j ≤ n, the private
announcement to j, written Prinj , is the BMS frame ({1, 2}, {Ri}ni=1, 1), where
Ri :=
{
{(1, 1), (2, 2)} if i = j,
{(1, 2), (2, 2)} if i 6= j.
We may write Prinj without the superscript n when n is clear from context.
The language of private announcement logic allows for a private announcement to each agent.
Definition 5.3. Let Pr be the n-agent signature {Prinj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, where the j-th BMS frame
in this signature is Prinj . The language Ln(Pr), also written PRIn, is called the language of private
announcement logic (without common knowledge). The language LnC(Pr), also written PRI
n
C , is
called the language of private announcement logic with common knowledge.
Private announcements provide for private communication by way of the following analogy. If










This formula may be read, “if no one knows p, then, after p is privately announced to j, only j
knows p.”10
5.3 Disguised Private Announcements
Finally, let us introduce announcements that can communicate private information to exactly one
agent while appearing to the other agents like a public announcement of something else.
Definition 5.4. Let Prinj = ({1, 2}, {Ri}ni=1, 1) be the private announcement to j. Then the
disguised private announcement to j, written Disnj , is the BMS frame ({1, 2}, {Ri}ni=1, 2). We may
write Disnj without the superscript n when n is clear from context.
Note that the difference between Prinj and Dis
n
j is the last coordinate, which is a 2 in Dis
n
j as
opposed to a 1 in Prinj . This difference is crucial, as it allows us to specify a formula other than >
that will define the position-2 submodel in the induced model. (Recall our discussion beginning on
Page 6 of the stepwise construction of the induced model.) We will see that this additional formula
is the “disguised” public announcement formula.
Definition 5.5. Let S be the n-agent signature {Disnj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, where the j-th BMS frame in
this signature is Disnj . The language Ln(S), also written DISn, is called the language of disguised
private announcement logic (without common knowledge). The language LnC(S), also written DIS
n
C ,
is called the language of disguised private announcement logic with common knowledge.
10To the author’s knowledge, there has not yet been a study of the formulas successful for private announcements
(the formulas that remain true after they are privately announced). Of course, the same issue can be studied for an
arbitrary (BMS) update.
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Disguised private announcements gain their name by way of the following analogy. If p and q






This formula may be read, “after p disguised as q is privately announced to j, we have that j knows
p while everyone else has the ‘false knowledge’ (that is, the belief) that q.”11
5.4 Results on Relative Expressivity
We now turn to our results concerning the relative expressivity of the three languages PALnC , PRI
n
C ,
and DISnC . We assume n ≥ 2 in order to avoid a technical pitfall.12 First a result from [3].
Theorem 5.6 (From [3]). For n ≥ 2, PALnC is not more expressive than PRInC .
Proof. It is shown in [3] that the PRInC-formula 〈p〉11ĈK̂2¬p is not expressible in PALnC , where p is
a propositional letter.
Theorem 5.6 is the technical sense in which we can say something with private announcements
that cannot be said with public announcements. Intuitively, this is obvious: private announcements
allow us to communicate privately, which is not possible with public announcements. However, this
result also works the other way around.
Theorem 5.7. For n ≥ 2, PRInC is not more expressive than PALnC .
Proof. In the appendix, we show that the PALnC-formula 〈p〉11Ĉq is not expressible in PRInC , where
p and q are propositional letters. The proof utilizes a model construction from [3] to show that the
generated tree model of the model induced by [p]11 is isomorphic either to a singleton or else to the
original model, which leads to the desired result.
We also ought to expect a result like Theorem 5.7; after all, the power of public announcements
comes from the fact that we can create common knowledge, whereas no finite number of private
announcements can achieve common knowledge [8].
Theorems 5.6 and 5.7 provide us with two important corollaries. Our first provides a formal
sense in which public and private communication are fundamentally different when we have common
knowledge.
Corollary 5.8. For n ≥ 2, PALnC and PRInC are expressively incomparable.
Proof. Immediate from Theorems 5.6 and 5.7 by Definition 4.3.
Our second corollary provides a formal sense in which private communication (with common
knowledge) allows us to say things that cannot be said with (common) knowledge statements alone.
11Notice that the second formula ψ in the modal [ϕ,ψ]aj only acts as a “disguise” when a = 1. If a = 2, then [ϕ,ψ]
a
j
induces the public announcement of ψ, something we prove later in Theorem 5.10.
12In particular, if n = 1 and we restrict ourselves to Kripke models that are reflexive and transitive, then Theorem






















Figure 1. Relative expressivity of various BMS Logics for n ≥ 2. L → L′ means that L′ is strictly more expressive
than L. L = L′ means that L and L′ are equally expressive. Credit for non-obvious arrows and equalities is given
using either citations to the bibliography or else references to corollaries in this paper. Note that our corollaries
combine this paper’s primary contributions, Theorems 5.7 and 5.10, with [3]’s result, Theorem 5.6.
Corollary 5.9. For n ≥ 2, PRInC is strictly more expressive than both Ln and LnC .
Proof. In [3], it is shown that PALnC is strictly more expressive than LnC . Combining this result
with Theorem 5.7 and the fact that PRInC is an extension of LnC , the result follows. The result for
Ln then follows from the fact that LnC is strictly more expressive than Ln.
Finally, we show that while public and private communication are essentially different, disguised
private communication captures both notions at once.
Theorem 5.10. Every PALnC-formula is expressible by some DIS
n
C-formula. Likewise, every PRI
n
C-
formula is expressible by some DISnC-formula.
Proof. By induction on formula construction. See the appendix for details.
Corollary 5.11. For n ≥ 2, DISnC is strictly more expressive than each of PALnC , PRInC , and LnC .
Proof. Follows from Theorems 5.6, 5.7, and 5.10 (notice that DISnC extends LnC).
Figure 1 summarizes our expressivity results alongside other known results.
6 Conclusions and Directions for Further Study
We have shown that public and private communication are expressively incomparable. This provides
a formal sense in which public and private communication are essentially different, something in-line
with our intuitions about these communication types. We have also shown that disguised private
communication is strictly more expressive than both public and private communication.
Nonetheless, using the phrase minimal combination of public and private communication to
refer to a smallest theory T such that every T -theorem expresses a PALnC-validity or a PRI
n
C-
validity, Corollary 5.11 suggests that the DISnC-validities are not the minimal combination of private
and public communication. Finding this T—which may be just a trivial restriction of the BMS
Logic of both public and private communications—would allow us to identify the collection of
T -theorems that express both a PALnC-validity and a PRI
n
C-validity, providing a sense in which
the PALnC-validities and the PRI
n
C-validities overlap. Studying this overlap may help us gain a
deeper understanding of the relationship between public and private communication: if the overlap
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expresses just the LnC-validities, then we have a sense in which public and private communication
are completely different; otherwise, if the overlap expresses more than just the LnC-validities, then
that part of the overlap that expresses common validities outside the LnC-validities is a description
of the ways in which public and private communication are the same.
In the broadest sense, this paper is the beginning of a larger study whose aim is to characterize
in general terms the relative expressivity of the language LnC(B) and the language LnC(B′). It is
the author’s hope that there is some natural criterion that holds between the signatures B and
B′ exactly when we have a particular relative expressivity result between the languages based on
these signatures. This would solve the relative expressivity questions for BMS Logic all at once
and would open the door for more considerations like those of the previous paragraph: what is the
minimal combination of the LnC(B)-validities and the LnC(B′)-validities, and how do these validities
overlap? Such questions, like those of the previous paragraph, await further investigation.
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Academy of Sciences, March 1992.
[9] Jan A. Plaza. Logics of public communications. In Zbigniew W. Ras, editor, Proceedings of the Fourth Interna-
tional Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems (ISMIS 1989). North-Holland, 1989.
[10] Johan van Benthem, Jan van Eijck, and Barteld Kooi. Logics of communication and change. Information and
Computation, 204(11):1620–1662, 2006.
[11] Hans van Ditmarsch and Barteld Kooi. The secret of my success. Synthese, 151:201–232, 2006.
13
A The Proofs
Preliminary Results: Isomorphisms and Generated Tree Models
In proving that the LnC(B)-formula ϕ is not expressible in the language LnC(B′), we will make use
of properties holding between model-world pairs that will be of great assistance in demonstrating
Item 1 of Definition 4.2, the condition saying that certain LnC(B′)-formulas cannot distinguish two
model-world pairs (that are distinguishable by ϕ). Our first property is isomorphism.
Definition A.1. Let (M1,Γ1) be a model-world pair in (W1, {R1,i}ni=1, V1), and let (M2,Γ2) be a
model-world pair in (W2, {R2,i}ni=1, V2). (M1,Γ1) and (M2,Γ2) are said to be isomorphic, written
(M1,Γ1) ∼= (M2,Γ2), if and only if there is a bijection f : W1 →W2 satisfying each of the following:
• f(Γ1) = Γ2;
• V1(∆) = V2(f(∆)); and
• for each j, we have that ∆R1,jΩ if and only if f(∆)R2,jf(Ω).
Such an f is called an isomorphism (between (M1,Γ1) and (M2,Γ2)).
Isomorphism is a well-known property of Kripke frames [4], so it is likely no surprise to learn
that isomorphic world-model pairs are indistinguishable by any formula of BMS Logic.
Lemma A.2. Let f be an isomorphism between the model-world pair (M1,Γ1) in (W1, {R1,i}ni=1, V1)
and the model-world pair (M2,Γ2) in (W2, {R2,i}ni=1, V2). Then for each LnC(B)-formula ϕ, we have
M1,∆ |= ϕ exactly when M2, f(∆) |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on formula construction. We will only handle the inductive case for formulas
of the form [~ψ]ajϕ because the base and remaining inductive cases are standard [4]. So we proceed,
arguing that M1,∆ |= [~ψ]ajϕ exactly when M2, f(∆) |= [~ψ]ajϕ.
If a ≤ dj , then we have by the induction hypothesis that M1,∆ |= ψa exactly when M2, f(∆) |=
ψa. So let us assume that each side of this biconditional is true. We must then argue that
M1[~ψ]j , (∆, a) |= ϕ exactly when M2[~ψ]j , (f(∆), a) |= ϕ. Note that for a > dj , we must prove this
same statement, so we will simultaneously prove what remains of the case a ≤ dj along with what
we must show for the case a > dj .




(ψM1i × {i}) ∪
m⋃
i=dj+1








where m is the number of worlds in the j-th BMS frame. It follows from the induction hypothesis
that for each Ω ∈ W1 we have M1,Ω |= ψi exactly when M2, f(Ω) |= ψi and thus f maps ψM1i
bijectively onto ψM2i . Now define the map f [~ψ]j : W
′
1 → W ′2 by f [~ψ]j(∆, a) := (f(∆), a). It
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follows from our assumption that f is an isomorphism between (M1,Γ1) and (M2,Γ2) that f [~ψ]j is
an isomorphism between (M1[~ψ]j , (∆, a)) and (M2[~ψ]j , (f(∆), a)). Our desired result then follows
from the induction hypothesis.
Our second property may be understand informally as saying that we can take the generated
tree model (also called the unraveling or the unwinding) of a model-world pair without affecting
truth. Before we formalize this statement, let us define the generated tree model of a model-world
pair, a familiar notion in modal logic [4].
Definition A.3. Let (M,Γ) be a model-world pair in the n-agent Kripke model (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ).
Then T (M,Γ), the generated tree model of (M,Γ), is the n-agent Kripke model (W T , {RTi }ni=1, V T )
defined as follows.
• W T consists of the sequences {∆i}ki=1 of worlds in W that satisfy each of the following: k ≥ 1,
∆1 = Γ, and for each l satisfying 1 < l ≤ k, there is a j such that such that ∆l−1Rj∆l.
• {∆i}ki=1RTj {Ωi}li=1 holds if and only if l = k + 1, we have ∆i = Ωi for each i satisfying
1 ≤ i ≤ k, and ΩkRjΩk+1.
• V T ({∆i}ki=1) = V (∆k).
Notation. Assume the notation of Definition A.3. We make the following abbreviations.
• We identify Γ with the unique length-one sequence in W T .
• We write ~∆ as an abbreviation for a world {∆i}ki=1 ∈W T .
• We write ~∆Rj~Ω to mean that for the sequence {∆i}ki=1 abbreviated by ~∆ and the sequence
{Ωi}li=1 abbreviated by ~Ω, we have {∆i}ki=1RTj {Ωi}li=1.
• For each ~∆ ∈W T , we write e(~∆) to denote the world ∆k in the sequence {∆i}ki=1 abbreviated
by ~∆. (The “e” stands for “end.”)
As expected, the generated tree model construction is truth-preserving.
Theorem A.4. Let M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ) be an n-agent Kripke model. For each LnC(B)-formula
ϕ and each ~∆ ∈W T , we have M, e(~∆) |= ϕ exactly when T (M,Γ), ~∆ |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on formula construction. We will only handle the inductive case for formulas
of the form [~ψ]ajϕ because the base and remaining inductive cases are standard [4]. So we proceed,
arguing that M, e(~∆) |= [~ψ]ajϕ exactly when T (M,Γ), ~∆ |= [~ψ]ajϕ.
By the same discussion as in the second paragraph in the proof of Lemma A.2, it is sufficient to
argue that M [~ψ]j , (e(~∆), a) |= ϕ exactly when T (M,Γ)[~ψ]j , (~∆, a) |= ϕ. To complete this argument,
we show that T (M [~ψ]j , (e(~∆), a)) ∼= T (T (M,Γ)[~ψ]j , (~∆, a)). Now worlds in T (M [~ψ]j , (e(~∆), a)) are
sequences {(Θi, bi)}mi=1 such that m ≥ 1, Θ1 = e(~∆), and b1 = a. Worlds in T (T (M,Γ)[~ψ]j , (~∆, a))
are sequences {(σi, ci)}ki=1 such that k ≥ 1, c1 = a, and each σi is a sequence ~Ω ∈ W T that
extends ~∆ (meaning that for the sequence {∆i}li=1 abbreviated by ~∆ and for the sequence {Ωi}mi=1
abbreviated by ~Ω, we have that m ≥ l and that Ωi = ∆i for each i ≤ l; notice that we have
Ωl = e(~∆)). Define the map f by setting f({(σi, ci)}mi=1) := {(e(σi), ci)}mi=1. It is not difficult to
see that f is an isomorphism.
It follows from the induction hypothesis that
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M [~ψ]j , (e(~∆), a) |= ϕ exactly when T (M [~ψ]j , (e(~∆), a)), (e(~∆), a) |= ϕ .
Applying Lemma A.2 and our result in the previous paragraph, we have
T (M [~ψ]j , (e(~∆), a)), (e(~∆), a) |= ϕ exactly when T (T (M,Γ)[~ψ]j , (~∆, a)), (~∆, a) |= ϕ .
Applying the induction hypothesis, it follows that
T (T (M,Γ)[~ψ]j , (~∆, a)), (~∆, a) |= ϕ exactly when T (M,Γ)[~ψ]j , (~∆, a) |= ϕ .
This completes our proof.
Theorem 5.7.
For n ≥ 2, PRInC is not more expressive than PALnC .
Proof. Let p and q be propositional letters. We will show that the PALnC-formula 〈p〉11Ĉq is not
expressible in PRInC .
It is shown in [3] that the PALnC-formula 〈p〉11Ĉq is not expressible in LnC . The proof involves
the construction of a finite model that we call Ck (here k is a positive integer that determines the
number of worlds in Ck). In this proof, we use the same construction for Ck, but we will instead
use Ck to prove the statement in the last sentence of the previous paragraph. So let us begin with
the construction.
For each non-negative integer r, define the n-agent Kripke model Cr := (W r, {Rri }ni=1, V r) as
follows.
• W r := {xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r + 1} ∪ {x̄i | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r + 1} ∪ {t, b}.
• Rr1 is the smallest binary relation on W r satisfying each of the following:
(x2i+1, x2i+2) ∈ Rr1,
(x̄2i+1, x̄2i+2) ∈ Rr1,
(x2r+1, t) ∈ Rr1, and
(x̄2r+1, b) ∈ Rr1;
here i satisfies 1 ≤ 2i+ 1 < 2r + 1.
• Rr2 is the smallest binary relation on W r satisfying each of the following:
(x2i, x2i+1) ∈ Rr1,
(x̄2i, x̄2i+1) ∈ Rr1,
(t, x̄1) ∈ Rr1, and
(b, x1) ∈ Rr1;
here i satisfies 2 ≤ 2i < 2r + 1.































Figure 2. The frame for the model Cr.
• V is defined by
V (xi) := {p}
V (x̄i) := {p}
V (t) := ∅
V (b) := {p, q}
where i satisfies 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r + 1.
Cr has the structure of a cycle of size 4r + 4 with the relations Rr1 and R
r
2 alternating around the
cycle beginning with Rr1 at x1. The top of the cycle is t and the bottom of the cycle is b. The
propositional letter p is true everywhere except at the top t, and the propositional letter q is true
only at the bottom b. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of the frame (that is, the nodes
and relations) for the model Cr.
Observe that for each non-negative integer r we have
Cr, x1 6|= 〈p〉11Ĉq and Cr, x̄1 |= 〈p〉11Ĉq ,
where 〈p〉11Ĉq is a PALnC-formula. This observation follows from the fact that Cr, t 6|= p, which
implies that the top t in Cr is omitted during the construction of the induced model Cr[p]11.
It is now our task to show that for each non-negative integer r and each PRInC-formula ϕ with
d(ϕ) ≤ r, we have that
Cr, x1 |= ϕ exactly when Cr, x̄1 |= ϕ ,
which completes our proof. To prove this, we show by induction on k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 2r, that for
each PRInC-formula ϕ with d(ϕ) ≤ k we have
Cr, x(2r+1)−k |= ϕ exactly when Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k |= ϕ .
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In the base case, k = 0 and we have that d(ϕ) = 0 implies that ϕ is in the language of propositional
logic; the result thus follows immediately. So let us assume that the result holds for all l satisfying
0 ≤ l < k ≤ 2r, and we prove that the result holds for k. We thus must show by a sub-induction
on the construction of a PRInC-formula ϕ satisfying d(ϕ) ≤ k that Cr, x(2r+1)−k |= ϕ exactly when
Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k |= ϕ. The only interesting case is the inductive case where ϕ is of the form [ψ]ajχ, so
we focus on this inductive case. So we are to show that
Cr, x(2r+1)−k |= [ψ]ajχ exactly when Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k |= [ψ]ajχ .
Now j indexes a member of {Prinj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} and a ∈ {1, 2}.
• Case a = 2.
It follows from the induction hypothesis of our sub-induction that
Cr, x(2r+1)−k |= χ exactly when Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k |= χ .
We also have that
T (Cr[ψ]j , (x(2r+1)−k, 2)) ∼= T (Cr, x(2r+1)−k)
and that
T (Cr[ψ]j , (x̄(2r+1)−k, 2)) ∼= T (Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k)
because the position-2 submodel is just Cr (since a > dj). Applying Lemma A.2 and Theorem
A.4, it follows that
Cr, x(2r+1)−k |= [ψ]ajχ exactly when Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k |= [ψ]ajχ
by the meaning of truth for formulas of the form [ψ]ajχ with a > dj .
• Case a = 1.
It follows from the induction hypothesis on our sub-induction that we have
Cr, x(2r+1)−k |= ψ exactly when Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k |= ψ ,
so we may as well assume that each side of this biconditional is true, which leaves us to show
that
Cr[ψ]j , (x(2r+1)−k, 1) |= χ exactly when Cr[ψ]j , (x̄(2r+1)−k, 1) |= χ .
– Sub-case: j = 1 and k is odd, j = 2 and k is even, or j > 2.
This case is represented diagrammatically in Figure 3. Let (x, 1) be the node x in
the position-1 submodel, represented in Figure 3 by the left cycle; let (x, 2) be the
node x in the position-2 submodel, represented in Figure 3 by the right cycle. Let
us see that when j and k are as in this case, no node in the position-1 submodel
can be reached from (x(2r+1)−k, 1). Notice that in Cr we have (x(2r+1)−k, y) ∈ Ri iff
y = x(2r+1)−(k−1), where i = 1 if k is even and i = 2 if k is odd. Further we have
(1, 1) ∈ Ri in Prinj iff i = j. When j = 1 and k is odd, i = 2 and so i 6= j; when







































Figure 3. A graphical representation of Cr[ψ]j in case j = 1 and k is odd, j = 2 and k is even, or j > 2.
i ∈ {1, 2}. It follows that
(
(x(2r+1)−k, 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1)
)
/∈ R′i of the induced model
Cr[ψ]j . So no grayed node in the position-1 submodel plays a role in the construc-
tion of T (Cr[ψ]j , (x(2r+1)−k, 1)). However, since (1, 2) ∈ Ri in Prinj iff i 6= j, it follows
that
(
(x(2r+1)−k, 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−1), 2)
)
∈ R′i of the induced model Cr[ψ]j ; this edge from
the position-1 submodel to the position-2 submodel is pictured in Figure 3. Taken all
together, we have shown that the non-grayed portions of our Figure 3 represent the
submodel of Cr[ψ]j generated from the point (x(2r+1)−k, 1), and only the nodes in this
point-generated submodel participate in the construction of T (Cr[ψj ], (x(2r+1)−k, 1)). It
follows that
T (Cr[ψ]j , (x(2r+1)−k, 1)) ∼= T (Cr, x(2r+1)−k) .
A similar argument shows that
T (Cr[ψ]j , (x̄(2r+1)−k, 1)) ∼= T (Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k) .
Applying Lemma A.2 and Theorem A.4, we then have that we are in the same situation
as in Case a = 2, so the result follows from our argument in that case.
– Sub-case: either j = 1 and k is even or else j = 2 and k is odd.
Since d(ψ) ≤ d([ψ]ajχ) − 1 = k − 1, it follows from the induction hypothesis on our
outermost induction that
Cr, x(2r+1)−(k−1) |= ψ exactly when Cr, x̄(2r+1)−(k−1) |= ψ ,
so the world x(2r+1)−(k−1) appears in the construction of the induced model Cr[ψ]j if and
only if the world x̄(2r+1)−(k−1) appears in the construction of this same induced model.
Figure 4 is a diagrammatic representation of the induced model Cr[ψ]j . (x, 1) is the













































Figure 4. A graphical representation of Cr[ψ]j for the case j = 1 and k is even and for the case j = 2 and k is odd.
the node x in the position-2 submodel, represented by the right cycle in Figure 4. Since
our conditions on j and k do not match those in the previous sub-case, it follows that(
(x(2r+1)−k, 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−1), 2)
)
/∈ R′i of the induced model Cr[ψ]j .
Let us assume for the moment that (x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1) is in this induced model. We will
show that (
(x(2r+1)−k, 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1)) ∈ R′i
and that (
(x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−2), 2)) ∈ R′i .
We first us show the former. We have (x(2r+1)−k, x(2r+1)−(k−1)) ∈ Ri in Cr iff we have
that i = 1 and k is even or that i = 2 and k is odd. We have (1, 1) ∈ Ri in Prinj iff
i = j. When j = 1 and k is even, i = 1 and so i = j; when j = 2 and k is odd,
i = 2 and so i = j. Thus
(
(x(2r+1)−k, 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1)) ∈ R′i. Let us now show that(
(x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−2), 2)) ∈ R′i. We have (x(2r+1)−(k−1), x(2r+1)−(k−2)) ∈ Ri
in Cr iff we have that i = 1 and k is odd or that i = 2 and k is even. We have (1, 2) ∈ Ri
in Prinj iff i 6= j. When j = 1 and k is even, i = 2 and so i 6= j; when j = 2 and k
is odd, i = 1 and so i 6= j. Thus
(
(x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1), (x(2r+1)−(k−2), 2)) ∈ R′i. Taken all
together, we have shown that if (x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1) is in the induced model Cr[ψ]j , then
the non-grayed portions of our diagram represent the submodel of Cr[ψ]j generated by
the point (x(2r+1)−k, 1), so it follows that T (Cr[ψ]k, (x(2r+1)−k, 1)) ∼= (Cr, x(2r+1)−k).
A similar argument shows that T (Cr[ψ]k, (x̄(2r+1)−k, 1)) ∼= (Cr, x̄(2r+1)−k). In the case
(x(2r+1)−(k−1), 1) is not in the induced model Cr[ψ]j , then T (Cr[ψ]k, (x(2r+1)−k, 1)) and
T (Cr[ψ]k, (x̄(2r+1)−k, 1)) are each isomorphic to the single-node model that has p true
and has each binary relation empty. It follows that we are again either in the situation
in Case a = 2 or else we have isomorphic one-world models. In the former case, the
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result follows from our discussion in Case a = 2. In the latter case, the result follows
from Lemma A.2.
Theorem 5.10
Every PALnC-formula is expressible by some DIS
n
C-formula. Likewise, every PRI
n
C-formula is express-
ible by some DISnC-formula.
Proof. Define the translation t from PALnC-formulas to DIS
n
C-formulas by the following induction.
pt := p, for p an atom
(ϕ ⊃ ψ)t := ϕt ⊃ ψt
(Kiϕ)t := Kiϕt, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(Cϕ)t := Cϕt
([ϕ]11ψ)
t := [>, ϕt]21ψt
We now show by induction on the construction of a PALnC-formula ϕ that M,Γ |= ϕ if and only if
M,Γ |= ϕt. We will only handle the inductive case for formulas of the form [ϕ]11ψ.
So we are to show that M,Γ |= [ϕ]11ψ if and only if M,Γ |= [>, ϕt]21ψt. By the induction
hypothesis, it follows that M,Γ |= ϕ if and only if M,Γ |= ϕt, so let us assume that each side of
this biconditional is true. What then remains is for us to show that
M [ϕ]1, (Γ, 1) |= ψ if and only if M [>, ϕt]1, (Γ, 2) |= ψt .
But it is not too difficult to see that T (M [ϕ]1, (Γ, 1)) ∼= T (M [>, ϕt]1, (Γ, 2)), and the desired result
thus follows from Lemma A.2, Theorem A.4, and the induction hypothesis. Thus we have shown
that every PALnC-formula is expressible by some DIS
n
C-formula.
To see that every PRInC-formula is expressible by some DIS
n
C-formula, we define a translation u
from PRInC-formulas to DIS
n
C-formulas by the following induction.
pu := p, for p an atom
(ϕ ⊃ ψ)u := ϕu ⊃ ψu




The proof that M,Γ |= ϕ if and only if M,Γ |= ϕu is similar. The key fact in this proof is that the
models M [ϕ]j and M [ϕu,>]j are identical.
21
